## Aff

### No Tradeoff---2NC

#### The DOD has more than enough resources, Congress just massively increased the budget and earmarked funding for Ukraine and other priorities

Connor O’Brien 22, defense reporter, POLITICO, “Senators tack on $45B onto Bidens Defense Budget”, 6-16-2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/16/senators-tack-45b-onto-bidens-defense-budget-00040154>, 7-9-2022

The Senate Armed Services Committee has endorsed a $45 billion increase to President Joe Biden’s military spending plans in its annual defense policy bill, blowing past the administration’s Pentagon budget for a second straight year.

The rebuke of Biden’s budget plans, which occurred during the panel’s closed-door markup of the National Defense Authorization Act this week, comes after lawmakers added roughly $30 billion to the White House’s previous defense spending proposal.

This week’s boost brings the bill’s topline budget figure to $847 billion, according to Armed Services Chair Jack Reed (D-R.I.). The goal, he said, is to counteract runaway inflation, aid Ukraine, replenish weapons sent into the fight against Russia, and fund military priorities left out of the Pentagon budget request.

### AT: Russia Strong

#### Russia’s military is weak – Ukraine proves

**Freedman 7/5** [Lawrence Freedman (An emeritus professor of war studies at King's College London.), 7-5-2022, "Can Ukraine win the war?," New Statesman, <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2022/07/can-ukraine-win-war-with-russia>] // st

In this second stage of the war, Russian forces have not been able to rely so much on manoeuvrability because of armoured vehicle losses. They have sought to make up for their losses with vehicles from the reserves, including, as widely reported, vintage tanks that were in use in the 1960s. New tank production may have ground to a halt because of the lack of key components, such as microchips, which have been sourced from the West and are now sanctioned.¶ Russia also seems to be running low on stocks of precision weapons, evident in some of their recent long-range strikes. It is likely, for example, that it did not intend the deadly attack on the shopping mall in Kremenchuk, and instead had a nearby target in mind, which it also failed to destroy. This demonstrated, in addition to the inaccuracy of its weapons, the general Russian carelessness when it comes to collateral damage and their inability to take responsibility for mistakes (as always, suggesting that for some reason the Ukrainians did this to themselves). Coming as the G7 was meeting, it helped to boost support for Ukraine, reminding the leaders about why it is important that Russia fails.¶ Their response to past troop losses has been to scramble around to find more troops where they can. One option for Putin would be to announce a general mobilisation but he has been reluctant to do that because he knows how unpopular such a move would be. There are indications of shortfalls in the current call-up of conscripts, even though they are not supposed to be sent to the front. Instead, the aim is to encourage conscripts, and anyone with military experience, to contract into the military, often for financial reward. There is anecdotal evidence that many of those who have been in the thick of the fighting have been looking for ways to get out of their contracts.¶ According to the military analyst Michael Kofman, Russian commanders are increasingly reliant on front-line fighting forces from the enclaves in Donbas, mercenaries from the Wagner Group, volunteers and reserve battalions manned by recently contracted servicemen. The fighting for Severodonetsk was largely undertaken by units from Luhansk, who appear to have suffered terribly in the process, and may now appreciate that they are being used as cannon fodder by the Russians. Kofman suggests that other units are being used for offensive manoeuvres, with the most capable being moved “around the battlefield to attempt localized advances”.

#### The war in Ukraine is draining Russia’s military power. Russia won’t be at pre-war military capacity for several years

**Culp 7/6** [Wesley Culp (A Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. He regularly writes on Russian and Eurasian leadership and national security topics and has been published in The Hill as well as in the Diplomatic Courier.), 7-6-2022, 19FortyFive, "The Russian Military After the Ukraine War: On the Brink of Disaster?", https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-russian-military-after-the-ukraine-war-on-the-brink-of-disaster/] // st

Open-source tracking from blogs such as Oryx reveals that Russia has lost a considerable amount of equipment to date in its invasion, including more than 800 tanks and almost 500 armored fighting vehicles at the time of writing.¶ Besides the losses Russian forces have taken, the ammunition expended by Russian forces is considerable and will take some time to replenish. According to Ukrainian sources, Russia is firing 60,000 artillery shells per day in Ukraine, a rate that would be taxing on the defense industrial base on any country that has not mobilized its economy for wartime production, which Russia has so far refused to do.¶ Russia’s arsenal of precision-guided munitions also appears to have been significantly depleted over the course of the invasion, limiting Moscow’s ability to strike certain military or transportation targets, especially those that are mobile. For years, Russian military doctrine has held that precision-guided munitions are a key tool alongside more conventional, unguided munitions.¶ The Russian Military: What Happens Next?¶ To recoup its materiel losses in Ukraine, the Russian military will need several years of serial production of everything from armor to munitions to reach pre-war reserve levels.¶ According to Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military affairs, organizational issues in Russia’s defense production base and disruptions to Russian defense supply chains as a result of sanctions placed on Russia following its 2022 invasion mean that it will likely take a minimum of four years for Russia’s armed forces to rebuild its arsenal of armored vehicles to January 2022 levels.¶ Reserves of precision-guided munitions will take even longer to reach prior levels as a result of similar pressures – Luzin estimates that it would take at least ten years for such stocks to be replenished.

### AT: Food Prices Impact

**No impact to food insecurity**

**Vestby 18** [Jonas Vestby (Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). His research focuses on the link between environmental change and violent conflict, including forecasting models that predict the future risk of conflict, taking climate change into consideration.), 5-18-2018, "Does hunger cause conflict? – Climate and Conflict," <https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/>] // st

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.¶ Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

### AT: NATO-Russia War

#### No chance of a NATO-Russia war

**Bose 22** [Nandita Bose (A White House correspondent for Reuters), 2-28-2022, "Biden says Americans should not worry about nuclear war after Russian actions," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-hosts-calls-with-allies-after-putin-put-nuclear-deterrent-alert-2022-02-28/>] // st

President Joe Biden said on Monday Americans should not worry about a nuclear war after Moscow put its nuclear deterrent on high alert amid a barrage of Western reprisals over Russia's invasion of Ukraine.¶ In response to a question about whether U.S. citizens should be concerned about a nuclear war breaking out, Biden said "no." He was responding to a shouted question at the end of an event at the White House.¶ White House officials said earlier in the day the United States sees no reason to change its nuclear alert levels at this time, a point press secretary Jen Psaki reiterated during her briefing with reporters.¶ "We are assessing President Putin's directive and at this time, we see no reasons to change our own alert levels," Psaki said.¶ Russia's defence ministry said on Monday its nuclear missile forces and Northern and Pacific fleets had been placed on enhanced combat duty, the Interfax news agency reported, in line with an order the previous day from President Vladimir Putin.¶ Psaki said the United States and the 30-member NATO alliance have no "appetite or desire" for conflict with Russia. "Provocative rhetoric like this regarding nuclear weapons is dangerous, adds to the risk of miscalculation, should be avoided and we'll not indulge in it."¶ Biden held a call with U.S. allies and partners on Monday, as a U.S. official said a nuclear war must never be fought. Joining the call with Biden were leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom along with NATO's chief and top officials from the European Union.¶ A White House official told Reuters that Russia and the United States have long agreed that use of nuclear weapons would have devastating consequences.¶ "A nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought," the White House official said. The White House also pointed out Russia has signed on to joint statements affirming a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.¶ Russian and Ukrainian officials met on the Belarusian border to discuss a ceasefire on Monday while invading Russian forces encountered determined resistance from Ukrainian troops and civilians on a fifth day of conflict. read more¶ Russia calls its actions in Ukraine a “special operation” that it says is not designed to occupy territory but to destroy its southern neighbour's military capabilities and capture what it regards as dangerous nationalists.¶ Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also triggered a Western economic and corporate response unprecedented in its extent and coordination.¶ The United States on Monday blocked Americans from engaging in any transactions involving Russia's central bank, dealing a crushing blow to the country's economy. read more

#### Russia doesn’t have the resources to take NATO head on – risk for conflict is low

**Culp 7/6** [Wesley Culp (A Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. He regularly writes on Russian and Eurasian leadership and national security topics and has been published in The Hill as well as in the Diplomatic Courier.), 7-6-2022, 19FortyFive, "The Russian Military After the Ukraine War: On the Brink of Disaster?", <https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-russian-military-after-the-ukraine-war-on-the-brink-of-disaster/>] // st

In the short-term, the risk of direct confrontation between the Russian military and NATO is low, save for accidental escalation, in large part due to the fact that the Russian armed forces are so thoroughly committed to the so-called “special military operation.”¶ Instead of being increasingly concentrated on Russia’s border with Norway and Finland following Finland’s official decision to apply for NATO membership, Russian forces in the area actually appear to be increasingly taking part in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.¶ Even before Moscow’s invasion, Western military analysts had good reason to be skeptical of Russia’s ability to conduct massive military operations outside the confines of the former Soviet Union.¶ In its existing state, the Russian military are highly dependent on rail links to ensure that its armed forces are properly supplied. Given the fact that only former Soviet countries and Finland use the same rail gauge as Russia, any sustainment operation of Russian forces outside the former Soviet Union would face significant logistical hurdles.¶ Russian Military Will Learn from Ukraine War Mistakes ¶ While some of the baked-in weaknesses of the Russian military model have been exposed by its invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO still have good reason to take competition from Russia as well as the prospect that Russia will learn from its mistakes seriously.¶ For example, while the Deputy Commander of the Estonian Defense Forces has claimed that Russia is likely too weak to put pressure on or seize the strategic Suwałki Gap (a source of some anxiety given ongoing drama surrounding Lithuania’s enforcement of EU sanctions on overland transport of certain Russian goods to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad), he also cautioned that Russia is no stranger to learning from its mistakes and adapting.

### AT: Reclaiming Territory

#### Putin won’t attempt to rebuild the Soviet Union – oligarchs, desire, NATO membership, and military capabilities prevent expansion

**Stanton 5/16** [Andrew Stanton (A Staff Writer for Newsweek and Boston Globe Metro Correspondent with a graduate degree in journalism from Emerson College), 5-16-2022, "Putin allies' wealth will keep him from reviving USSR," Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/putin-allies-wealth-keep-him-reviving-ussr-1706979>] // st

Russian President Vladimir Putin's reliance on oligarchs could prevent him from reviving the Soviet Union, experts said.¶ Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, some raised concerns that Putin could be seeking to revive the Soviet Union. But a return to Soviet-style economics could threaten the wealth of his allies in Russia's oligarchical class, so it's unlikely he would seize their assets, Bryon Moraski, a professor of Russian politics at the University of Florida explained to Newsweek.¶ Putin relies on both popular and elite support for legitimacy, Moraski explained. This means that any efforts to seize the assets of Russian oligarchs could cause him to lose the support of his closest allies, potentially leaving him in a difficult position as the president.¶ "There wouldn't be an ideological reason for Putin to go through some kind of process for the redistribution of property," Moraski said.¶ Brian Taylor, a professor of Russian politics at Syracuse University, offered a slightly different view, saying that Russian oligarchs would have little recourse if Putin were to seize their assets—though he agreed it remains unlikely he would reconstruct the Soviet Union.¶ "If Putin decides that it has to be nationalized, the legal system is not going to stop him from doing that," he told Newsweek.¶ Moraski, however, said that even if Putin tried to seize oligarchs' wealth, much of it rests offshore, so he would have a difficult time obtaining it.¶ Taylor explained how Putin trying to bring back the USSR in geographic terms would harm the wealth of Russian oligarchs.¶ Putin attempting to retake some of the former Soviet Republics would cause these oligarchs to take on additional sanctions—in addition to those already imposed amid the Ukraine invasion.¶ The oligarchs would also likely have to take companies seized by Russia during the war, but this would not be a "welcome gift," as they would need to invest money into these businesses that would have been ravaged by war, Taylor said.¶ "Who are they going to ship the product to? Because it's not from a legally recognized part of Russia so it would be immediately sanctioned by everyone," he said.¶ Both Moraski and Taylor agreed there are other reasons Putin remains unlikely to revive the Soviet Union—including that the president has no ideological desire to do so, as the current political system in Russia is more pragmatic or "personalist," rather than having the same communist or Marxist ideology as the former Soviet Union.¶ The Russian military's mounting setbacks in Ukraine mean it would be difficult to invade other former Soviet republics, some of which (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are "off the table" because they are now members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Taylor said. Any attack on these countries would spark a strong Western response.¶ "I don't actually think he has any particular interest in some of the other republics of the former Soviet Union, as opposed to keeping them in the Russian sphere of influence," he added. "I don't think he wants to annex Tajikistan or Armenia or something like that."

#### The current status of the war proves that Russia is uncapable of victory or further expansion as a great power

**Green 22** [Mark Green (A physician and combat veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq where he served three tours. He interviewed Saddam Hussein for six hours on the night of his capture. He serves on the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees.), April 4, 2022, "How Putin’s isolation mirrors ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’," Washington Times, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/apr/4/how-vladimir-putins-isolation-mirrors-the-fall-of-/>] // st

In war, miscalculations can lead to disaster. Mr. Putin and his military leaders both overestimated their forces’ capabilities and severely underestimated the strength of the Ukrainian resistance. The Russian army has thus far been plagued by poor logistical operations, careless tactics and significant difficulty in executing a multi-front invasion. Likewise, the Russians have not yet gained air superiority over Ukraine despite having a substantial advantage in airpower. Although the Russians have made advances, particularly in the south, their progress has been sluggish, and the fighting has exposed severe vulnerabilities in Russia’s military strategy and tactics. Conversely, the Ukrainians, armed with Western weapons and fighting fiercely to defend their homeland, have put up a stiff resistance that has exacted a steep price from Russian troops.¶ Furthermore, it seems that Mr. Putin did not expect and was not prepared for the robust international response to his invasion. This may drive him further into his paranoiac isolation. The sanctions against Russia’s economy are some of the harshest ever imposed on a country of its size, threatening to devastate an economy that is highly dependent on the export of natural resources, especially oil and gas.¶ This puts Mr. Putin in a dangerous position, as his isolation from even his closest advisers could lead him to escalate the conflict and make further ill-considered decisions. Just last week, Mr. Putin had one of the top generals of his invading units arrested for allegedly leaking intelligence and squandering fuel. If his invasion continues to encounter setbacks and higher-than-expected casualties, Mr. Putin’s paranoia could lead him to further miscalculations. What was supposed to be a prime opportunity for Russia to reassert its dominance over a former Soviet territory has instead revealed its weakness.¶ Mr. Putin is more than just a paranoid ruler backed into a corner. He is an evil dictator obsessed with power and has been for a long time. But will Mr. Putin isolate himself further and allow his paranoia to fuel greater mistakes? In the Poe story, the reclusive Usher’s growing suspicion steers him into catastrophic mistakes that end in tragedy and the collapse of the house. Mr. Putin would be foolish to let his obsession to reunite the Soviet Union drive him to double down on his errors and insist on a decisive military victory in Ukraine. Instead, he should cut his losses and call off the invasion to bring an end to this destructive and needless war.

### AT: Russian Chem, Bio, or Nuke Weapon

#### Russia using a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon is absurd

**NATO 7/7** [NATO, 07-07-22, "NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine," <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm>] // st

Russia’s threatening nuclear rhetoric in its war on Ukraine is dangerous and irresponsible. The Kremlin sees nuclear threats as an all-purpose response to setbacks. NATO is not a threat to Russia and does not seek confrontation with Russia. The Alliance’s actions are defensive and a response to Russia’s aggression. So there is no reason for Russia to increase the readiness of its nuclear forces. Any use of nuclear weapons by Russia would fundamentally change the nature of the conflict, and it would have unprecedented consequences for Russia. Russia must understand that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.¶ The Russian foreign ministry’s claims about a Ukrainian biological weapons programme are baseless and absurd. Russia is once again inventing false pretexts in an attempt to justify its invasion of Ukraine. NATO will continue to call out Russia’s disinformation and lies for the world to see. Any use by Russia of a chemical or biological weapon would be a violation of international law and a war crime, and result in severe consequences.

### AT: No NATO-Russian compromise

#### Russian response to Finland and Sweden being added into NATO proves that NATO and Russia can compromise – the only threats including violence are defensive

**Ellyatt and Marcias 7/1** [Holly Ellyatt (Correspondent for CNBC focusing on European macro-economics and politics.) and Amanda Macias (National security reporter for CNBC focusing on national security and foreign policy.), 7-1-2022, ”‘Everything was going fine between us,’ Putin says of NATO expansion; Russian forces withdraw from Snake Island,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/30/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html>] // st

Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to NATO’s forthcoming expansion, saying he has no problem with Sweden and Finland joining the military alliance, but that if infrastructure is deployed to those countries, Russia will respond in kind.¶ Putin’s comments come after the Western military organization officially invited Sweden and Finland to join it in a historic move on Wednesday. That was made possible after a deal was forged with Turkey to accept the membership bids after initial objections from Ankara.¶ The alliance also reiterated its condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, outlined plans to beef up its defenses in Europe and said China posed a “challenge” to its interests.

### AT: DIB

#### The DIB is in the dumps

**Tegler 22**, 2-4-2022, Eric Tegler is a Contributor for Forbes in [AEROSPACE & DEFENSE](https://www.forbes.com/aerospace-defense/)"The Defense Industrial Base’s Vital Signs Aren’t Looking Good," https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2022/02/04/the-defense-industrial-bases-vital-signs-arent-looking-good/?sh=215e90c02101

For the last three years, the [National Defense Industrial Association](https://www.ndia.org/) has issued an annual report on the health of America’s Defense Industrial Base. While the state of the U.S. defense industry has been a source of angst for decades, the NDIA’s latest report is the first to assess the environment in which its members operate as broadly failing.

The study, [Vital Signs 2022](https://www.ndia.org/policy/vital-signs), found deteriorating conditions for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) in eight categories, including industrial security, supply chains, productive capacity and surge readiness.

Wes Hallman, NDIA’s senior vice president of strategy and policy, says that this year’s study depicted a broadly negative environment in part because it uses lagging publicly available data. Though compiled in 2021, it uses 2020 data (SEC Form 10-K public filings, public contract data, government indicators including contract failure rates) which finally became available in the first quarter of 2021. It will similarly use the 2021 data it receives this March for next year’s report.

The study does include a survey conducted in summer 2021 of NDIA’s members, large and small, with over 400 respondents. That more up-to-date survey illustrates a situation that is not improving, exacerbated by inflationary pressure and congressional gridlock on the defense budget.

“As you look at our previous reports, you see areas of fragility and concern,” Hallman notes. “Covid really shined a spotlight on those concerns whether they’re workforce challenges, supply chain, etc.”

NDIA’s researchers say they expect they’ll get similar responses to their survey questions this coming year, which should raise alarm bells adding to those that have been sounding for years. The NDIA asked members if they thought their 2022 performance would match their 2021 business. Fourteen percent said they thought they would not perform as well.

NDIA’s regulatory policy associate Robert Van Steenburg, adds that one survey response pointedly stood out.

“We asked our members, ‘Are you the sole eligible supplier for the good or service you provide? Thirty percent of them said yes.”

Altogether, the public data and survey responses in the report yielded five key takeaways, the first centering on the effects of the pandemic. Not surprisingly, 71% of respondents reported “moderate negative” or “large negative” impacts due to Covid-19. This was reflected in a cash conversion cycle that fell by 38 points in 2020 according to NDIA scoring.

The data lag in the report may not fully reflect the impact of massive government expenditures for Covid relief. Total relief spending by the U.S. on the pandemic is over $6 trillion, or roughly 27.1% of the nation's GDP, the third-highest globally, according to data published by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget.

The defense contractors which constitute NDIA membership were declared “essential” early in the pandemic and thus never stopped working during initial lockdowns. Nevertheless, many of these companies had exposure to the broader economic activity halt through complimentary commercial business lines in aerospace, airlines and elsewhere. More pure defense contractors with less exposure appeared to do better but still suffered productivity losses.

Those have continued despite the torrent of spending thanks in part to federal measures - or the threat of federal measures - related to vaccine mandates.

“There is a portion of the [DIB] workforce that is reticent about vaccines,” Hallman affirms. “Even where companies are 90% vaccinated, there are key personnel that are hard to replace which has caused some lines to shut down, some contracts to go into failure.” He adds that NDIA continues to communicate this reality to policy makers “so there is an understanding that these policies have real impact on the defense industrial base”.

Workforce issues continue to be a challenge, the pandemic notwithstanding. In the report, 67% respondents said it was “somewhat difficult” or “extremely difficult” to find cleared workers. There were similar results for skilled trade workers, and STEM workers. A security clearance backlog that reached approximately 700,000 individuals a few years ago has improved, but Hallman says that progress appears to have stagnated.

Nick Jones, NDIA’s regulatory policy director, says contractors view this as a critical systemic problem beside lower workforce participation across the economy.

“Our membership was asked what part of your supply chain is most vulnerable? The most frequent response was the gap in U.S.-based human capital. It’s really the workforce that is increasingly the limiting factor for many of these companies. There’s an aspect of Covid in this but it’s been ongoing and is really tangential to the Covid crisis.”

The prospects for innovation in the DIB scored negatively as well. The study reported a drop in the number of new entrants in the sector from 6,500 in FY19 to 6,300 in FY20. That trend looks set to continue, a reality reflected in a series of public discussions by policy makers, participants and the Pentagon over the last year.

“There should have been a lot more new entrants into the contractor ranks whether through Covid-related Defense Production Act contracts or through companies in the commercial sector looking for a safe haven,” Wes Hallman asserts. “The fact that the number didn’t go up but down despite Covid [contracting/spending] is an interesting statistic.”

The oft cited problem of the so-called “Valley of Death” wherein innovative, small defense companies go out of business in the gap between receiving R&D funding and getting an actual contract in a program of record may get worse Hallman points out.

“The latest version of the National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] did not extend the SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] authority. The program sunsets on the 1st of October of this year. That’s a bad signal.”